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Abstract
In contrast with the production of goods and services by ﬁrms, where the production
costs are minimized under appropriate behavioral assumptions, consumer-producers in
neoclassical theory maximize consumption expenditure, i.e., production costs of their
outputs. According to Kenneth Boulding, were the impact upon the limited resources
available on planet Earth taken into account, consumption expenditure should be
minimized. We propose that we keep consumer theory as a reasonable description of
reality. However, we should evaluate the long run consequences of such postulated behavior
in a larger context, which, as a consequence of larger population with increasing per capita
consumption, comprises the overburdening of natural resources. By decomposing the time
horizon of cultural evolution into shorter periods of adjustment, we may then distinguish
several types of institutional determination of how societies take decisions, as a group
and individually. The consumer theory simply reﬂects the predominant ethical values, of
which ideologies, political platforms, and demand patterns are shorter run adjustments.
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Resumo
Em contraste com a produ¸ c˜ ao de bens e servi¸ cos por ﬁrmas, onde os custos de produ¸ c˜ ao
s˜ ao minimizados, dadas suposi¸ c˜ oes comportamentais adequadas, consumidores-produtores
tˆ em como objetivo a maximiza¸ c˜ ao das despesas de consumo, i.e., dos custos de produ¸ c˜ ao
de seus produtos. De acordo com Kenneth Boulding, se o impacto sobre os recursos
dispon´ ıveis no planeta Terra fosse considerado, as despesas de consumo deveriam ser
minimizadas. Propomos que a teoria do consumidor seja mantida como uma descri¸ c˜ ao
razo´ avel da realidade. Contudo, devemos avaliar as conseq¨ uˆ encias de longo prazo
de tal postulado comportamental num contexto mais amplo. Como conseq¨ uˆ encia de
uma popula¸ c˜ ao crescente junto com um crescente consumo per capita, esse contexto
considera o impacto da maximiza¸ c˜ ao do consumo sobre o uso excessivo dos recursos
naturais. Decompondo o horizonte temporal da evolu¸ c˜ ao cultural em subper´ ıodos de
ajustamento, podemos distinguir diversos determinantes de como as sociedades decidem,
como grupo e individualmente. A teoria do consumidor simplesmente reﬂete os valores
´ eticos predominantes, dos quais ideologias, plataformas pol´ ıticas e padr˜ oes de demanda
de bens s˜ ao ajustamentos de prazos mais curtos.
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1. Introduction
Consumption is something implicitly desirable in models of utility maximization.
In the circular ﬂow, consumers sell goods and services – basically labor services in
more advanced economies – so as to buy consumption goods. Market work is one of
their outputs, and the goods consumed may be interpreted as inputs. In contrast
with the production of goods and services by individuals operating through ﬁrms,
where the costs of production of goods are minimized under appropriate behavioral
assumptions, consumer-workers have as objective the maximization of consumption
expenditure, i.e., costs of production of their outputs, once they choose time for
market work. Social welfare evaluations are made under such assumption, as in
cost-beneﬁt analysis. In a well-known paper, 1 Kenneth Boulding raised a criticism
against this assumption. Were the impact upon the limited resources available
in the spaceship Earth taken into account, consumption expenditure should be
something to be minimized.
The main implication for the ecological debate is that societies that maximize
consumption may, in the long run, get in trouble if the natural resource limitations
are not considered. Based on this criticism, we may reject the whole neoclassical
theory or argue that preferences should be changed. The microeconomics of
consumption allows for global satiety over the preference relation, although the
theory of demand is generally developed for the nonsatiety case. Therefore, the
question remains whether such a postulate is a mere description of the average
pattern of consumption in the world today or whether such preference could be
diﬀerent, even if economists are not forewarning societies about its dangers. Either
we abandon the economic theory of consumer as we know it or we keep it as a
reasonable description of reality and evaluate the long run consequences of such
behavior in a larger context. After all, even if consumer preferences were to be
abandoned in this kind of analysis, someone’s preference would still have to be
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1 See Boulding (1966), who thinks in terms of throughput, a concept that also comprises the net
addition to the capital stock. Daly (1985),p.289 shows that Boulding argued along these lines since
1949.
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considered, as Krautkraemer (1998),p.2099 reminds us, sometimes in the form of
moral imperatives.
We initially look at how standard consumer theory considers inputs and outputs,
and then discuss, in the light of ecological questioning, the proposal for consumption
as costs that should be minimized. Thus, in the next section, we consider how inputs
and outputs are deﬁned in the context of household production theory. Then, in
the following sections, we review and evaluate the criticisms made by the ecological
literature, placing the question of nonsatiety in consumption in a larger institutional
context that includes ethics.
2. Inputs and Consumption
We will ﬁrst review how consumption is treated in both consumer and household
production theory. We also discuss the related practice, in general equilibrium
models, of using negative variables to distinguish inputs from outputs. This is
related to how consumption is viewed in consumer theory.
Consumer theory is usually presented as an ordering of commodities 2 that are
consumed. In an attempt to take care of labor supply, leisure time is also included in
the ordering relation. Actually, the supply of work, an output from such a consumer,
is deﬁned as a residual from the endowment of work time in the period of analysis,
after leisure time is chosen. A more general approach is to start with endowments
of each good and work time, and deﬁne excess demand functions for each of them.
Whether a commodity is input or output from the viewpoint of the household,
we deﬁne it by the sign of the excess demand variable. The point of zero excess
demand depends on the preferences of the agent, with the respective marginal rate
of substitution deﬁning the reservation price. The only exception to this is the
excess demand for work. In such a a case, the endowment is given by nature and
the agent may only supply own work, i.e., work time can only be an output. With
reselling being a possibility, the demand for someone else’s work is just the demand
for a service like any other. In this case, whether the individual will seek to work
or not depends upon the reservation price.
In the context of household production, the economic agent buys commodities
to produce consumption goods and market commodities. In the simplest situation,
the worker buys commodities for direct consumption and at the same time sells
work as a commodity. We can thus see work as a produced commodity. In this
productive process, goods consumed represent inputs. This is the approach used
by the classical and a few modern economists like von Neumann (1945), a 1938
2 The preference relation is the way consumers order commodity bundles. Despite the fact that this
ordering does not require the concept of utility, it is usual to speak of goods as generating satisfaction
or pleasure to consumers. In fact, the concept of welfare of a consumer is metaphysical in the sense
that it appears through its consequences, being nonmeasurable. In spite of being known for attempts
at measuring utility, Fisher (1930), ch. 1 – inﬂuenced by Vilfredo Pareto – postulates that utility is
unmeasurable. Postulating an arbitrary function and estimating it so that it ﬁts a preference relation,
which is the approach started by Fisher in his attempts at measuring utility, is not the same thing as
measuring the psychological concept of utility. It is only a description of the preference relation.
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article originally in German. For a given agent, the deﬁnition of a commodity as
input or output now depends on market prices. In agricultural production, this
is easier to see. For example, the farmer may be a net buyer or a net seller of
corn; it depends, among other things, on comparative advantages associated to
the productive process. Thus the deﬁnition of the list of inputs and outputs is an
empirical question.
In a simple household production model, the consumer buys goods as inputs
for domestic production. Work still is the output. The domestic production
process generates outputs that are used as inputs in the consumption process.
But from the viewpoint of our analysis what counts is the production for the
market by the household. Thus the domestic production process is ignored. A
generalization follows when we consider the possibility of some other outputs of
domestic production besides work being sold in the market. Firms can then be
seen as an extension of the power of production of households through the social
division of work. Therefore, the concept of input and output, or more generally,
netput, is the same as in domestic production.
A related question is the direction of preference for inputs and outputs. In the
model where the only produced domestic commodity is work for the market, the
rule of more preferred to less (monotonicity) applies to every commodity in the
preference ﬁeld. Work, being a residual, is not listed in the preference ﬁeld. This
direction of preference implies that a commodity is a good from the viewpoint of
the consumer. It is something the consumer is willing to trade some other thing
for it. The same procedure of treating work for the market as a residual is also
followed in the household production model.
However, there is a set of commodities whose preference direction would be
reversed, that is, less of each would be preferred to more. They are known as bads.
This is the case, for example, of domestic garbage. Instead of having to worry
about the direction of preference for each type of good, the theoretician simply
redeﬁnes the consumption activity involved. In the example, domestic garbage is
treated as getting rid of it. Instead of an output it would be considered input.
This idea is then extended to treat negative externalities, like pollution. A related
concept is the noxious commodity (Debreu (1959), p.33) which involves a negative
price. The economic agent would pay for an output. It would be an alternative
theoretical treatment of a bad. But then the price vector would have to allow for
negative variables. A quick look at popular textbooks in economics shows that the
procedure of redeﬁning bads as goods has won the preference of the profession.
A further related question about inputs and outputs of a household is their
representation through variables with sign restrictions.In some theoretical quarters,
especially in general equilibrium models, there is a lack of symmetry in the
treatment of the ﬁrm and the consumer. Inputs are represented by nonpositive,
and outputs by nonnegative, variables in the description of the ﬁrm. This makes
it easier to generalize theorems on comparative statics from proﬁt maximization.
Several results follow by simply making explicit the sign of the netput. But when
it comes to the consumer, the practice is to reverse the signs of inputs and outputs
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(Debreu (1959), p.30 and 51). 3 It appears that this lack of symmetry has to do with
equating supply and demand. Outputs from ﬁrms are nonnegative variables. So,
demand by consumers should also be nonnegative variables, despite being input to
consumers. As a consequence, the fact that goods consumed are inputs to economic
agents tends to be underplayed. It is such a point that Boulding’s proposal for
minimizing consumption puts in evidence. His ideas gained evidence with the wave
of concern about running out of basic natural resources in the 1970s, followed by
a renewed concern with excess population in the world.
3. Evolution and Consumption Economics
The postulate of preference for higher consumption has been used as a good
representation of reality. So, we keep it as a basis for our analysis. We may then
look for the implications of this behavior, and ask whether, from a longer run
viewpoint, preferences might encompass a concern with the environment. In order
to look for these consequences, we will discuss consumption in an evolutionary
context.
The more the better is the motto of the representative consumer. Exceptions
are few, like the hippies of the 1970s, with a few of them still going around, and
some religious groups. In the wake of the antiglobalization movement, “buy-nothing
days” have been called for.
Of all that is produced in each period, the main limitation to consumption in
that period is what is put aside as savings. The interaction between savings and
consumption is what deﬁnes the trajectory of the stock of capital and, consequently,
the trajectory of consumption itself for a given economy, which can be the world.
The intertemporal preference of such a society deﬁnes how much is saved in each
period, thus conditioning the trajectories of the whole system and the level of
the long run per capita income. So, at this point of the analysis everything is
tied to preferences of consumers. Nonsatiety is now interpreted intertemporally,
but subject to the wealth available at the moment of the decision. Intertemporal
preferences deﬁne how this wealth is managed from there on. Most of modern
theory of growth is a variant of this basic idea, including technological progress,
government, and endogenous population growth. In the present ecological context,
this kind of theory has been associated with the names of Robert Solow and
3 It seems that this convention originates from suggestions made by Samuelson (1947), p.215 and 237.
He mentions Barone (1935), a 1908 article originally in Italian, as his source, but in fact we could not
ﬁnd such a convention in that paper. Enrico Barone simply subtracts input costs, inspired in accounting
practices, as does Fisher (1930). Subtracting a positive variable from another is slightly diﬀerent from
working with negative variables. The generalization that is straightforward with the latter is less elegant
with the former. So it seems that Paul Samuelson is really the one who introduced the convention. Of
course, attempts at correcting Samuelson’s Foundations, even in praising the author, should consider
the story mentioned in Samuelson (1998),p.1378, about the seventeenth Japanese student to point out
a given error of the book.
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Joseph Stiglitz. The models involve a time horizon between half and one century,
as suggested by Stiglitz. 4
This long run is short enough to be seen during a lifetime. In fact, the Twentieth
Century comprised several examples of economic phenomena that occurred in such
a long run, especially the several experiments in promoting economic development
for diﬀerent countries around the world. It is known that John Maynard Keynes
said that in the long run we are all dead, in the context of his theory of aggregate
employment. He was certainly using a rhetorical strong image for economists, since
he himself saw the realization of some of his pessimistic predictions on the long run
of European political relations.
We thus return to consumer preferences as a basic determinant of the evolution
of an economy. A basic question then is whether preferences evolve in the long run.
In the time horizon of growth models, they do not. It also seems consistent with
reality. As the household production literature usually supposes, what changes
most frequently is the technology of production of commodities. The nature of
commodities, or of services demanded, changes little. Take entertainment services
as example. In the last decades, there have been great changes in the way these
services are provided. More speciﬁcally, many persons saw ﬁlms only at movie
theaters in the ﬁfties and then started seeing ﬁlms on TV, but with fewer options.
Later on, they could see ﬁlms of their choice at home, ﬁrst with tapes and now
with compact disks. Despite all these technological changes, the service has been
entertainment provided by a movie. In reality, ﬁction performed by a group of
actors is as old at least as the Greek tragedies of over a couple of millennia ago.
However, in a longer time horizon than the one of growth models, preferences may
change. Norton et al. (1998) survey the literature on this question and argue that
preferences evolve, being formed both culturally and genetically. Bergstrom (1996),
pp.1906–1910, in the context of the economics of family, also surveys the literature
on the evolution of preferences, even presenting some formal models of preference
formation towards relatives. Preferences reﬂect “problem-solving abilities and a
complex of general tastes and desires that are correlated with reproductive success
in a great variety of situations”. Cultural evolution is an adaptation by these
general tastes to diﬀerent environments. 5 Change in preferences due to genetic
conditioning is much slower than due to cultural conditioning.
Lintott (1998) surveys the literature on factors that lead to nonsatiety in
consumption, or to excess consumption, as related to “basic material needs”. One
of these factors is envious consumption, usually known as Duesenberry type or
4 See Daly (1997), where Robert Solow and Joseph Stiglitz reply to a paper by Herman Daly, who
brings back earlier criticisms made by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen on papers from the 1970s, especially
Stiglitz (1974) and Solow (1974). See also Mayumi et al. (1998). In the growth literature this idea of
time horizon is discussed in terms of transition dynamics. Ortigueira and Santos (1997) show with an
endogenous growth model that the time horizon is mostly unaﬀected by changes in the parameters of
intertemporal preference. See also Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) for growth models which show that
habit formation and “keeping up with the Joneses” eﬀects modify the transition dynamics but not the
end-result of a convergence to similar steady states.
5 According to an explanation by Ofek (2001), ﬁrst comes the propensity to exchange, which then
aﬀects preferences and even some biological characteristics of humans.
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Veblen type consumption. Other factors are traps such as addictive consumption
and impulsive buying. He also mentions loss of security in modern society as
compared to traditional society, the need for stimulus by high-income consumers
while low-income consumers need comfort, and consumption as a form of displaying
belonging to a group or social status. 6 Advertising reinforces most of them.
An increasing world population strengthens the eﬀect of high consumption upon
natural resources. It seems that population growth has occurred at low rates for
most of the millions of years of humankind evolution. Twenty centuries ago, the
world population numbered approximately 300 million people, and attained only
310 millions ten centuries later. Then it increased faster reaching 790 millions in
the year 1750, with annual growth rates under 0.5%. Finally, in the following 2.5
centuries, the world population grew to 6 billion people, with growth rates as high as
2% in the 1960s, although with a tendency to lower rates afterwards. A graph of this
time series would show that we are in the upper steeper part of a logistic curve. The
basic questions are how long we still have to travel along this curve before its upper
ﬂatter region is reached and how high this region stands. Under this hypothesis,
the present high population growth is temporary. But, starting about the time of
the Industrial Revolution, this population growth has been coupled with increasing
average per capita consumption. Also, this access to higher consumption and its
stabilizing eﬀects on population growth have not yet reached the whole world. In
the 2004 revision, the United Nations median estimate for the year 2050 was a
world population of 9.1 billion people. 7 However, Foley (2000) estimates a stable
world population between 7 and 8.5 billion people, based on a model that takes
account of endogenous population growth and technological progress. If we look at
a logistic curve based on the mentioned population data, Foley’s result means that
the world population growth will be drastically lowered so as to nearly stabilize
total population in one or two centuries from now.
It is unnecessary here to review the consequences of such a population size for
the evolution of other species that co-evolve with humans and for the eﬀects upon
natural resources. Earth’s capacity to sustain a large human population during
a short period is very diﬀerent from carrying such a population for an indeﬁnite
period. 8 The voluminous literature on these consequences is sometimes referred to
6 Ono (2002) extends an overlapping generations model that accounts for the impact of habit formation
on the environment. The negative eﬀect of habit formation through consumption externalities is not
clearcut since it depends upon the degree of habit formation and the fact that a generation may care
for the environment.
7 See Kremer (1993), Table 1, and Robinson and Srinivasan (1997). Present numbers diﬀer somewhat
from Kremer’s. We preferred the United Nations data (www.un.org/popin), although they give much
higher numbers for the ﬁrst ten centuries. Even with Kremer’s numbers, which start at 170 millions, at
AD, and reach 265 millions, by the year 1000, the growth rates are very low, so the argument above is
not aﬀected. A related hypothesis is that the early long period of low population growth is the upper
ﬂatter part of a previous logistic curve whose steep part coincides with a population spurt at around
13.000 years ago. On this earlier period, see Smith (1992) and Diamond (1997).
8 Examples from this literature are Daly (1997), Robinson and Srinivasan (1997), Krautkraemer (1998),
and Arrow et al. (2004). In a shorter time horizon, some non-renewable natural resources are not
being exhausted as predicted in the 1970s. Investments in prospection and continuous technological
progress, mostly induced by market institutions and corresponding price adjustments, have postponed
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as neo-Malthusian, because of its concern with the impacts of population growth
upon limited natural resources, not necessarily in a pessimistic vein. In this sense,
the present paper, of course, may be considered as part of the neo-Malthusian
literature.
From the evolutionary point of view, the consequences of excess use of natural
resources may be seen in diﬀerent time horizons. A very long run is one in which
genetic change in humans occurs. Results from genetic evolution are basically
unpredictable, except for some tendencies. 9 A long run could be the one in which
cultural evolution occurs. As we will see below, even this time horizon can be
decomposed for diﬀerent aspects of cultural evolution. 10
Within the time horizon of cultural evolution, the predator-prey model might
be applicable. This model involves a process that repeats itself and allows for
prediction. Methodologically, this predictability means that equilibrium models,
inspired in classical mechanics, can approximate some types of interaction among
diﬀerent species, considering the genes of such species as given. Although
nonpurposeful, genetic selection optimizes in a statistical sense by its pruning of
gene variations that are less adapted to a given environment. Besides, it involves a
qualitative transformation in the species as compared to its previous form. Thus,
calculus models would be inappropriate since they are of the arithmomorphic kind,
not allowing for qualitative transformation in the variables whose change rates in
quantities are being described. Nevertheless, in the last few decades, biologists and
economists have been using the theory of games, which can be seen as a type of
mathematical optimization, to describe evolutionary processes in nonmechanical
fashion. Qualitative changes still imply new payoﬀ matrices in the corresponding
games. 11
Brander and Taylor (1998) develop a predator-prey model to explain the
predatory action of a population group upon renewable resources, the prey. Their
main application is to the case of Easter Island, but several Mesopotamian
civilizations plus the Chaco Anasazi and the Maya civilizations are mentioned.
They are examples of excessive predation. This predator-prey model need not result
solely in extinction, as for the civilization of Easter Island. Diﬀerent values for the
this exhaustion. Relative prices and technological progress may also give economic value to as yet
untapped natural resources, further delaying global exhaustion. As for renewable resources, there is
the sink problem, specially caused by pollution. However, assignment of property rights and other
properly designed incentive schemes might lead to an environmental Kuznets curve, whereby economic
development initially worsens the environment, but as countries get richer they can pay for a better
environment. But in a longer time horizon, at least in terms of centuries, the impact of humankind
growth upon natural resources is not an idle question.
9 Evolution may be seen in a narrow and a broad sense, according to Faber et al. (1998), p.40. In the
narrow sense, it may repeat itself, so that the history of a process might be used to understand another
that repeats itself. Examples are the evolution of a seed into a plant or of a young organism into an
adult. This allows for prediction. In the broad sense, evolution is an open process, with a high degree
of unpredictability as to the details of the process, its changes and duration.
10 Foley (2003) distinguishes time horizons that are complementary to the ones presented here. Climate
related models involve time horizons that go from 200 up to 400 years. Demographic models have time
horizons from 25 to 100 years. Economic policy evaluation models have shorter time horizons.
11 See Georgescu-Roegen (1988), Cronin (1991), Hodgson (1993), ch.13, Faber et al. (1998), ch.8, Khalil
(1998), and Symposium (2002).
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parameters of the diﬀerential equations, reﬂecting various realities, may generate
more optimistic results. Some of the parameters reﬂect the preferences of a society
in relation to consumption versus maintenance of its resources.
We can now return to our discussion of cultural evolution from a diﬀerent angle of
view. Cultural evolution is related to the evolution of information. Even biological
evolution itself can be interpreted as such. We may see the survival of the ﬁt
as the survival of the genetic code. Reproduction means transmitting to the next
generation a set of bits of information on the characteristics and on the rules for the
formation, growth, and aging of an organism. It is such information that survives
as the environment conditions the individuals and species that will succeed. 12
We may see cultural evolution as the evolution of information on the
exosomatic organs of humankind. The evolution of the artiﬁcial extension
of human organs through human made instruments appears in distinguishing
endosomatic from exosomatic evolution. 13 The former is conditioned by
information transmitted genetically. The latter involves transmission through
various means of communication and storage: imitation, conversation, writing, law,
custom, and religion. The know-how for making and keeping the material base of
humankind is embedded in these means of storage, and materializes in its objects
and services.
Objects and services evolve themselves. For example, the diﬀerent means of
transportation still ﬁll the same need for humankind, but they have evolved
signiﬁcantly. To begin with, there is a biological part in the evolution of
transportation means, given that human individuals are able to move themselves
while plants can not, despite also being organisms. But we want to emphasize the
exosomatic evolution of the extended legs of humans. Early in history, humans
12 Dawkins (1976) further develops the genetic selection theory, – which takes as the unit of analysis the
gene itself instead of the organism as in classic Darwinism, – extending it to the evolution of culture,
with the help of the concept of memes. On the history and impact of this approach on biology, see
Cronin (1991). On the gene as information, see Monod (1976),ch.1, a 1970 book originally in French,
and Boulding (1978), pp.32–33. As such, the gene is capable of reducing entropy in the system associated
to an organism. Thus a related instrument of analysis is the theory of information, although we should
diﬀerentiate between structure-information (the genetic type) and message-information. Søren Brier
has written on this question from the viewpoint of semiotics. There are, in fact, several paradigms
on how to treat information. Of the four approaches that attempt a generalization across disciplines,
listed by Brier (2003), the mechanical materialistic is the one that treats information as the inverse
of entropy. The others are the pan-informational, the Luhmanian second order cybernetic approach,
Peircian biosemiotics and ﬁnally the pan-semiotic approach. Brier proposes a synthesis in the form of
a cybersemiotic model that implies an evolutionary process for all types of information. In economics,
a discussion of the mechanical materialistic approach can be found in Georgescu-Roegen (1971),app.B
and Mayumi (2001), ch.4.
13 On genetic conditioning of culture, see Wilson (1978). The evolution of exosomatic organs is a
concept associated, in economics, to Georgescu-Roegen (1971), who of course refers to Alfred J. Lotka
(see Mayumi et al. (1998)). Dawkins (1999), whose ﬁrst edition is from 1982, has chosen to interpret
exosomatic organs as extended phenotypes in order to ﬁt them in the genetic selection theory. Thus,
a machine would evolve according to the beneﬁts to humans. A diﬀerent approach is to consider
these organs as independent species that symbiotically evolve with the human species (Dawkins 1999),
although with a much higher speed of adaptation. In the example of the machine, its blueprint would
evolve governed mostly by an exchange of services with the human species, in the same way that
domestic animals do. However, when we consider the time horizons involved in genetic change versus
cultural change, the model of co-evolving species seems to ﬁt better the facts. The diﬃculties in using
the biological metaphor for cultural analysis are stressed by Hodgson (1993) and Khalil (1998).
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learned how to domesticate other species and to use them for transportation. 14
That technology still evolves today, especially in sophisticated sports. However,
millions of people in the poorer parts of the world use ancient technologies in
transportation. Other instruments of transportation started as complements with
animals. Today the basic means of transportation such as cars, ships, and planes
seem to have a life of their own. Some species become better adapted to their
environment, and new species still appear. 15
What evolve, in fact, are the blueprints for making these extended organs.16 As
long as the means for transmitting the blueprints keep existing, these blueprints
will change their form, and new species will appear, in some cases with the
disappearance of old ones. For societies in which the cultural structure suﬀers a
complete breakdown, like the Chaco Anasazi and the Mayas, and, for that matter,
even Ancient Egypt, some of the blueprints become either lost or unintelligible. The
corresponding exosomatic arms become extinct. We have only their fossils, although
in many cases the blueprints may be rediscovered by reverse engineering. 17
The means for transmitting and processing information evolve themselves. Rosser
Jr. and Barkley (1999),p.177, based on Langton (1989), presents a curious debate
from the area of artiﬁcial intelligence. Some of the participants argued that
computers are intelligent and a species that will eventually rule the Earth. In
fact, this position was widespread in science ﬁction literature and the movies
during the 1970s, when the mainframe computers dominated the market. The
rise of microcomputers, a new species, and of the decentralized communication
among them weakened the power of prediction by those neo-Orwellian ﬁction
writers. In this new technological environment, at least for now, powerful states
and large corporations have to be careful not to be laughed at by teenagers. Even
then, debates such as this are part of the needed analysis of the evolution of the
exosomatic brain of humankind.
Culture can thus be seen as a label that describes the stock of information, or
of blueprints, on exosomatic organs of a human group. 18 These organs include
institutions, viewed as restrictions on individual behavior for the sake of the group,
besides tools, machines, and procedures. 19 For example, bureaucracy, sometimes
14 Diamond (1997),ch.9 discusses the availability of domesticable animals in diﬀerent parts of the world
for transportation purposes.
15 Under this conception, it is natural to see diﬀerent species of transportation machines as
contemporary substitutes to earlier predators of the human species, as the statistics on traﬃc-related
deaths show.
16 Monod (1976),ch.1, uses the metaphor of the blueprint to contrast artiﬁcial with natural objects.
Organisms have the capacity for self-reproduction while artiﬁcial objects need external forces for the
same purpose. On the whole, Jacques Monod might be seen as a precursor of the extended phenotype
argument, already applying it to culture.
17 See Dawkins (1988),p.174, for a discussion of fossil genes, within a living organism, that might again
become functional.
18 We, of course, are just choosing a convenient deﬁnition of culture for the present paper. Ruttan (1988),
in a discussion of culture from the viewpoint of an economist, needs a two-page list of deﬁnitions of
culture in anthropology. Our deﬁnition mostly adapts the ﬁrst two.
19 The term procedure is akin to the concept of governance structure, as developed by Williamson
(1985). We use procedure as a more limited description than governance, being closer to the concept of
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execrated, is seen at Weberian quarters as one of the fundamental inventions that
allowed for civilization. We may see it as procedures for coordinating actions of a
human group, by deﬁning functions that are not dependent on speciﬁc persons.
Persons in a bureaucratic structure are simply replaceable. Replacements may
be trained with the procedures of a production line, something that the early
civilizations already put to service for military purposes. Without the diﬀerent
species of bureaucracy, modern states and enterprises would not exist. 20 As another
example, the institution of democracy is a species of the various procedures for
social decisions, also with a long evolution.
Consumption preferences are part of culture and evolve with it. From the
viewpoint of biophysics, the human being is a converter of mass into energy.
The energy produced is used to get more mass, so the life process of a given
individual may go on, including reproduction. Getting this energy and guaranteeing
reproduction involves recipes with inputs that vary according with the environment
in which humans live. The preference relation is equivalent to a production function,
as far as the requirements of inputs are concerned.
Economists used to think that inputs were converted into utility or into
some diﬀerent, and more complex, concept of satisfaction. During the ﬁrst half
of the Twentieth Century, they gradually abandoned this approach, and they
currently say that the consumer simply ranks combinations of commodities, without
specifying what the output of consumption is. In relation to the economic theory of
consumer behavior, they could say that a metaphysical concept is involved in place
of utility. 21 It might be satisfaction or any motivation like impulsive consumption
due to advertising, imitation or a sense of belonging to a group. Not drinking wine,
due to a religious imposition, even if the person would otherwise enjoy it, could
ﬁt in the last type of motivation. The system of incentives in social interaction
might also induce consumption. For example, having an expensive brand new car
is sometimes a signal from high executives, especially in the ﬁnancial sector, to tell
peers that all is well in ﬁnancial terms for that person. Once in a while the signal
misleads.
In the production of goods and services, the quantity and types of inputs used
are mostly chosen so as to minimize costs, if the ﬁrms are proﬁt maximizers. In
consumption, humans are guided by culture. Currently, culture is such that the
tendency to the maximization of aggregate intertemporal consumption, or some of
its variants from optimal growth models, is an important objective for all societies,
and it is reﬂected in the way economists describe consumer behavior. From the
viewpoint of ecology, this is very discouraging. However, our discussion until now
stressed decisions by individual agents, ignoring social decisions. Group decisions
form part of the social environment for consumers and, although they are a result of
subroutine from computer programming.
20 The role of institutions in the rise of capitalism is at the center of the studies of Douglass North,
of which, for brevity, we only mention North (1981). On institutionalism in general, including its
relationship to evolutionary economics, see Hodgson (1998).
21 See Lewin (1996), especially p.1309.
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interaction among individuals, they also have a feedback on individual preferences.
This is the theme for the next section.
4. Ethics and Politics
As part of the human evolutionary process, institutions evolve like everything
else. They are elements of the set of procedures that societies have to regulate their
life. In a given moment, all individuals are subject to a set of these procedures
that has resulted from a long evolution. Culture conditions preferences, but the
interaction of individual preferences may modify culture in the long run in an
evolutionary fashion, i.e., not planned as in the case of consumption decisions. In
fact, evolution of institutions is related to politics, ideology and ethics. We will
present them as phenomena of the same nature, which diﬀer essentially in the time
horizon involved. Before that, though, there is a type of institution that has been
singled out in recent literature to explain economic development, and which we will
relate to our discussion of preference for high consumption. It is property rights.
Property rights as an institution, in the sense that one person recognizes the right
of another to withhold an object, seem to have appeared in the range of 40 and 20
thousand years ago. It began with personal utensils and weaponry. It is diﬃcult to
know how the results of hunting were allocated, although it is most probable that
an equitable distribution was the rule, with some bias towards the more productive
hunters. But the rise in importance of agriculture around 13 thousand years ago,
probably as a result of scarcity in animal preys, led to the adoption of property
rights on land as a mean to its conservation. We are not considering as regulated by
property rights the territory that belongs to a community, like territories of tribes
in prehistoric societies, something also common for many nonhuman species. 22
Property rights evolved into many forms and today we have several layers of
property for capital goods, including property certiﬁcates, stocks and mutual funds.
Money, in several forms, might be seen as an all-purpose undeﬁned-owner property
right. All of them are directly and indirectly tied to human made goods and natural
resources that can be managed in such a way.
However, there are goods and resources that are diﬃcult or even impossible
to be managed through private property. They involve some forms of externality.
Examples are the problems of pollution or of open access, the latter due to high
excludability costs. When the number of individuals in a given community is
relatively small and the resources may become a property of this community, like a
piece of grassland, a river or a lake, then the process of demand revelation is viable
for avoiding strategic behavior in the form of free riding. With large numbers of
22 See Smith (1992) and Magee (1993). Baker (2003) presents a model that endogenizes the
land ownership institutions, relating them to the ecological characteristics of the territory
and to defense technology.
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people, a more indirect procedure for resource allocation of those commodities, the
political process becomes cheaper than direct decision.
Our classiﬁcation omits resources with international open access. The world is not
a community in the sense of being able to assign property rights to such resources. It
is more like a group of aborigines that hunt separately and are still setting up basic
procedures for administering the common territory, with all the possible conﬂicts
that this entails. The nations of the world meet frequently to discuss the procedures
for managing common resources, but incentives for free riding are strong. Were
not for the fact that each nation is a complex of a great number of individuals,
the negotiation over common international resources would be relatively cheap to
carry on, and agreement on the best use of communal resources would be easy to
get at. It is a well-known result in the public good and externality literature that
small numbers of agents lower the transaction costs for preference revelation on
these matters. Mart´ ınez-Alier (1998), in a book on popular ecologism, lists several
cases of successful management of communally owned resources in relatively small
groups. Sometimes these allocational procedures are congealed into age-old customs
and even into religious practice. In international terms, some progress has occurred
such as the ban on the CFC gas, the limitations on whale hunting, and the Kyoto
Protocol. 23
Similar successes can not be listed for equity questions yet, being limited mostly
to help during local natural, or political, disasters. The public good character
of income concentration, which motivates national redistributive programs in
rich countries, does not motivate similar initiatives on international income
concentration. Not surprisingly, it is very diﬃcult to motivate taxpayers from rich
countries to pay for redistributive programs abroad.24
On public goods questions, even at the international level, the political process
is then the means for social decisions. Of the several ways to model the political
process, we stress here the one that has evolved from the writings of Joseph A.
Schumpeter and Anthony Downs. This form of modeling sees the political process
with the lenses of neoclassical economics. Politicians sell the service of representing
citizens in taking collective decisions. For this they get together in political parties
and share costs of production, including advertisement, and even sell the equivalent
to brand names, namely ideologies. The political market may be competitive or not,
depending on barriers to entry. The pure proﬁt of exercising the political profession
depends thus on competition, as in markets for consumption commodities. The
members of the electorate choose platforms by voting, but they may allocate,
to inﬂuence elections and the choice of policies, their own resources in ﬁnancial
form or through their own work time. As in industrial organization theory, the
complexiﬁcation of the state is associated with the result that the representatives
take decisions many times in their own interest. In politics, there might also be
23 For the game-theoretic issues in international environmental agreements, see Wagner (2001), Sandler
(2004), Caplan and Silva (2005), and Oliveira et al. (2005).
24 See Anand and Sen (2000) for a general discussion of this question.
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a bias towards those groups of citizens that directly ﬁnance political campaigns.
We may also describe power in the political market. Authoritarian governments
are essentially a monopoly case. But in the long run, they are also subject to
competition, although in the form of conﬂict, as with price wars in markets for
goods under oligopoly. 25
Under a competitive political system, party platforms may absorb new issues
in a relatively short time horizon. Questioning may start anywhere in society. As
an example from local government, a part of a city may become fetid and lose
options of leisure due to pollution of a river. The mostly aﬀected people may
question this, at ﬁrst privately, and then through the media and politicians, who
work complementarily, to start a public voicing of the issue. Sometimes new political
parties are formed around a public problem, as in the movement for redistributing
income after the Industrial Revolution and, more recently, the ecological movement
in Europe. New issues are always raised and, as in markets for goods, political ﬁrms
try to diﬀerentiate their output in order to enter or guarantee a larger slice of their
market. Some of the issues are successful in the political market, but most of them
are not. Most have only a local impact, but a few may even capture the international
attention.
Some policy issues have a longer time horizon than the ones of the alternation
of political parties in power or of authoritarian governments. They involve the
deﬁnition of procedures and the distribution of social production and political
power that are meant for a long duration. In fact, these issues condition many
party platforms or even proposals of groups that are candidates for staying in
power as authoritarian governments. We call this process ideological competition,
in the same way that political platforms compete within a shorter time horizon. 26
The extension of economic theory to this problem is similar. We can even think
that, if party competition occurs under a given ideology, the situation is equivalent
to a short run. In the long run, ideologies will also be adjustable and become an
instrument for political competition. 27
If the time horizon is further stretched, there are social procedures meant for
an even longer duration, preferably for the life of the corresponding society. This
is ethics. Rules of right and wrong evolve with universal applicability. They are
functional for the survival of societies. 28 These principles transcend the duration
25 See Miller (1997) on what has been the inﬂuence of economics upon political science along these
lines.
26 See North (1981),ch.5 for a look at ideology as a means to lower transaction costs in market
transactions and social decisions. The ideology concept of Antonio Gramsci seems to have a longer
run view than Douglass North’s. An incumbent ideology, at service to a hegemonic group, may suﬀer
the competition of a diﬀerent ideology from another group. However, Gramsci discusses ideology in
terms of the Marxian dialectics, and this creates methodological conﬂicts with the present analysis.
27 In this approach, the state is not the ultimate deciding agent in society. In fact, there is no ultimate
agent. Politicians, even in the authoritarian cases, are constrained by potential competition, although
in dictatorships power shifts might take longer.
28 In evolutionary theory, this requires choosing between group selection and genetic selection, the latter
being roughly equivalent to the individualistic approach in social sciences. In fact, the unit of analysis
of neoclassical economics is the individual, with the meaning of a representative agent, i.e., a kind of
average behavior. See Cronin (1991), Kirman (1992), and Hodgson (1993).
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of ideologies, which are mainly an instrument of political power for groups that
alternate in the political process. There are ethical principles that survive through
the millennia, some of them being part of the most important religions. However,
given their generality and their very long time horizon, they may sometimes lag
behind the evolutionary process of the corresponding societies, eventually creating
disadvantages for the survival of the respective institutions. S¨ ollner (1998) calls
them lock-in eﬀects.
The competitive process among diﬀerent ideologies and ethical amendments
could be described by evolutionary principles. As mentioned above, the competition
among political platforms has been described by models from neoclassical
economics, which involve the notion of equilibrium and, therefore, predictability. In
order to avoid this mixture of methodology, we could think of the whole economic
and political process in evolutionary terms. The equilibrium positions would be at
most focal points in the evolutionary process. However, this kind of theory is still on
the making. 29 If it helps the reader, the mixture of equilibrium and evolutionary
methodologies has also been successfully applied in biology, especially by Alfred
Lotka and J. Maynard Smith (Cronin 1991). As long as better alternatives in
social sciences are not developed, the mixture of methodologies can still yield good
insights.
Ethical questions have been recently raised in connection with the patterns
of consumption and population growth, due to their environmental impact. 30
Increased concern with these questions could eventually lead to changes in the
predominant anthropocentric ethics of consumption. In fact, these proposals
compete with each other and could eventually ﬁnd their space in the human mind.
We may alternatively think about ethics and ideologies as public goods that are
part of the set of procedures collectively used to regulate social life. 31
The proposal of Boulding (1966) for consumption minimization can be seen
as one of many possible ethical proposals. If they win the minds of the human
species in the future, inducing changes in consumption preferences, new systems
of incentives would evolve in line with those objectives. If the worst predictions
of some neo-Malthusians are realized, the discussion and adoption of new ethical
views might be the only hope for the human species. If they are wrong, even the
most optimists might concede that the time horizon of high consumption of natural
resources is ﬁnite. Again, at least the discussion of ethical views is important, but,
29 Hodgson (1998),p.185 mentions Thorstein Veblen, Friedrich von Hayek, and Douglass North. See also
Khalil (1998).
30 For an ethical approach on consumption versus ecology, see Dasgupta (1998). Earlier, Campbell
(1987) explained the spread of consumerism in England during the ﬁrst industrial revolution on the basis
of an evolution from the protestant ethic, as proposed by Max Weber for the supply side, to a romantic
ethic, for the demand side. The change from a puritan view of the world, with its potential for depressed
aggregate demand, to a hedonic view went through many historical detours. Romantism contributed
to consumerism by giving high value to individuality, imagination, and the search for novelty. See also
Reisch (2001) for a discussion of novelty.
31 See Faber et al. (1997) and S¨ ollner (1998), who start from a political viewpoint. See also Faber et al.
(1998). Robinson and Srinivasan (1997), for example, deﬁne ethics as a public good.
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of course, in a much more relaxed mood. The main trouble is that the degree of
uncertainty in all predictions on natural resource exhaustion is very high.
The time horizons of political platforms, ideologies, and ethics are thus part of
the time horizon of cultural evolution. In a still longer run, there is the genetic
evolution. 32 The genetic inheritance from the time humans were simply hunters
might adjust to the present environment, which is based on the intensive use of
agricultural techniques and on an industrial system that feeds on stocks of low
entropic energy. But of course, with the present scientiﬁc knowledge, any prediction
as to which direction humans will evolve is highly uncertain. In fact, experts on
the use of complexity theory for social and natural phenomena would argue that
any prediction would be impossible for such a long run. 33
5. Conclusion
We saw the process of social decisions as embedded in genetic and cultural
evolution. When we break down the time horizon of social decisions into
progressively shorter periods of time adjustment, we may distinguish several
types of institutional determination on how societies take decisions, as a group
and individually. These decisions include consumption matters. The postulate of
maximizing an index of preference, under the nonsatiety assumption, is reasonable
for an aggregate approach and should not be blamed as the culprit of the possible
coming down of humankind from a steep cliﬀ due to natural resources exhaustion.
It simply reﬂects the predominant ethical values, of which ideologies, political
platforms, and demand patterns are shorter run adjustments.
When collective decisions on public goods and on externalities, and even on
the institutional apparatus that inﬂuences patterns of private consumption, show
evidence of leading to the exhaustion of means of long run survival of the human
species, attempts at proposals for social engineering might have their way in. These
proposals may defend shortcuts in the evolution of institutions, sometimes based on
not well-established scientiﬁc knowledge about social processes. They might yield
unpredictable results, although in the end they are a part of the cultural evolution
of humankind. Some of them are equivalent to a genetic variation. Despite many of
these changes being evolutionary failures, they are part of the process of generating
new ones.
32 Faber et al. (1998) deﬁne evolution in such a way as to also include a time horizon for inorganic
matter. It would be the longest of them all. The fact that consumption decisions may be taken under
a given culture, or that ideological competition may occur under a given ethics, means that the Le
Chatelier principle from physics might be applicable. Starting with Samuelson (1947), and by using
the mathematics of this principle, economists have shown, for example, that a long-run demand may
have a diﬀerent price-elasticity as compared to a corresponding short-run demand. Inspired in this idea,
which is formally obtained from optimization problems, we could say that a political, platform-based,
decision over natural resources would be diﬀerent, perhaps better adjusted to desirable ends, if the
dominant ideology and ethics of the society were also adjustable. But longer run adjustments, by the
very deﬁnition of diﬀerent time horizons, take more time to be made.
33 See Rosser Jr. and Barkley (1999) for a critical review of complexity theory in economics.
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If predator-prey phenomena are identiﬁable, then some predictability is involved.
Well-informed proposals for institutional reform, in the sense of being based on
hard scientiﬁc evidence, could have predictable results. Perhaps development in
scientiﬁc knowledge might also help in evaluating current successful institutional
arrangements, at least in predator-prey situations. These arrangements include
private property, with its incentives for resource preservation, at least in some cases,
and democratic public decision making, with its faster adjustment to changes in
opinion of societies. But there are those who accuse precisely these institutions
of being the instruments for driving humankind to fall down from the steep cliﬀ.
Unfortunately, scientiﬁc knowledge in the social sciences is not developed enough
so that fewer theories do survive tests against reality. And, of course, there are
those who say that we will never have such a scientiﬁc progress due to the kind of
phenomena we study.
To end this study, we could bring back the introductory statement that, if
we rejected individual preferences as the basis for economic theory, we should
make explicit whose preferences we are putting in their place. The Easter Island
civilization was successful for almost a thousand years, but when the exhaustion of
resources started to set in, speeded up by a drastic climatic change, it seems that
they made a wrong diagnosis of the cause of resource shortage. They thought the
low level of raining caused the shortage in log availability. The religious solution
of statue carving did not perform well and their civilization collapsed after a
relatively short period. Perhaps, as suggested by Brander and Taylor (1998), a
better scientiﬁc knowledge on forestry and on the working of institutions would have
meant a diﬀerent evolutionary path. Therefore, their institutions and the resulting
structure of preferences concerning the use of natural resources were inadequate
for the survival of the Easter Island society.
If well informed by science we could go somewhat against such a process, by
aﬀecting the evolution of social institutions, we might at least postpone our end
for a much longer run. Robert Solow’s position, which reﬂects a highly inﬂuential
viewpoint in economics, is that beyond the time horizon of standard growth models,
perhaps adjusted for endogenous population growth and technological progress,
economics has little to say. In a way, we also conclude that this is really a
task for politicians and philosophers. But since Solow-type growth models only
look forward, it means that this time horizon, though being relatively short, has
the starting points continuously being pushed forward. But the time horizon of
environmental problems is much longer. Well, this might still be interpreted as a
car going towards the edge of a steep cliﬀ, driven by a short-sighted driver. When
the driver sees the edge of the cliﬀ, it might be too late for braking, unless the
speed of the car is, just by luck, safely low.
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